9.6. What was learnt and what was not?

The most important thing that the National Socialist system taught the future generations was the knowledge of what kind of a pedagogical ideology it was not reasonable to build an educational system on, and in the service of what kind of interests of power politics it shall not be set, if we wish to make progress in the development of a democratic society. According to Gamm (1995, 19), the history of the National Socialist Germany can be read as a struggle for the supremacy in Europe and the world. Culture and education also justified these imperialistic goals of the politics of supremacy. For this reason the democratic contents of the pedagogical ideology, culture and civilisation are most important, if the thesis of the political nature of pedagogy is considered to be credible.

The National Socialist system taught a distorted method to exercise power that was based on totalitarian supremacy. The system was not, however, without morality. A "morality" and moral code restricted to one"s own group was learned. At the same time it was not learned to respect the universal morality that would also guarantee democracy and equality to the other groups. The content of the moral code was built on the idea of nationality and patriotism and on the individual being prepared to sacrifice himself for the benefit of the community. The acknowledged principles of liberalist democracy were put into the service of the totalitarian system in such a way that the purpose was to conceal ideologically the totalitarian nature of the system.

National Socialism taught something about questions of responsibility, morality and the problems of ethical education. The construction of a totalitarian power system raises the moral question of who will assume the responsibility for the consequences of the system which are after all realised in and through people"s action. Is the responsibility to be borne by the leaders of each power system or the citizens, or both for their own part? Here it is also necessary to consider what the possibilities are and within which limits for an individual citizen to exert influence, as well as what the possibilities and limits of collective influence are. When we try to explain the influence of the National Socialist ideology on the social learning processes, we are trying to find answers to the questions how the construction of such a mentality was possible as a collective consciousness, and how the politics of truth and the pedagogical ideology account for the emergence of National Socialism. The brutal use of a pedagogical ideology in the service of the interests of power politics shows why ethical and moral education is necessary. The analysis also makes it possible to suggest certain criteria for the direction of ethical education. Taking a stand on moral issues is, however, always somewhat daring, especially if the normative attitudes turn into expressions of opinion in issues of guilt. This has, however, been the case in studies of National Socialism, which is partly due to the fact that social reality after the Second World War was built in this way on account of the war crimes trials. Normativeness has in its search for the guilty party identified Germans with the National Socialists without any justification, giving them both a morally condemning definition, while the Jews have been defined hereby as morally acceptable, but still as people who belong to a different caste, which has served to reproduce the old antithesis. Moral attitudes must, however, take into account the losses that the Germans suffered as well as the fact that not all Germans were National Socialists.

National Socialism also taught a totalitarian method to exercise power that was based on subordinative and suppressing supremacy, fraud, propaganda and manipulation as well as violence, killing and death. It was part of the learning process to learn to keep silent about the insults that were inflicted. It was learned, above all, what it means to be persecuted. National Socialism or its barbarous incarnation Auschwitz taught, or it should have taught, that this kind of exercise of power is morally condemnable — that there is a need to change it or to learn other methods to use power. The relation between pedagogy and learning is, however, always difficult in the sense that pedagogy does not merely produce the intended learning results but it also produces unintended "by-products". The National Socialist education did not produce the desired results in all respects but also produced some unintended results. It was not successful in manipulating all of the Germans into supporters and implementers of an ideology that was functional for the system. In addition to manipulation, there was also activity that can be more justifiably referred to as education on the basis of the fact that it fostered human growth unlike National Socialist propaganda and manipulation did. The manipulation pursuant to the totalitarian ideology did, however, function efficiently as a rule. This education tinged with manipulation also had its own risks which was seen in the post-war situation as it became apparent that the manipulation had not resulted in very permanent learning results favourable to the National Socialist ideology in the minds of people. An effort was made to root out the social learning processes conforming to the National Socialist ideology as carefully as possible after the collapse of the National Socialist system.

There is a good reason to ask on which conditions the National Socialist pedagogical ideology would not have had even the influences that it did have. First of all, this would have required an opposition and resistance against the system among professional and other educators, which was suppressed quite successfully on a large scale in the National Socialist system. There was no rebellion among the recipients, as it was suppressed in this violent system. Secondly, it would have required that people did not identify themselves with the ideology in question and especially with its incarnations, the "Führers". One of the most important factors threatening successful education is that the one being educated does not identify himself with the educator (a person or a pedagogical idea). Both the educators and the educatees mostly identified themselves with the "Führers" in the National Socialist system. It was characterised by a leader cult and the worship of the highest Führer. The learning processes in totalitarian social system were also conflicting by nature, not totally parallel, although the ruling powers in such societies always have the goal of parallelising their direction. The microprocesses of society also included processes which were against the prevailing system and ideology.

The pedagogical and educational system functioned as the most important mechanism to promote this learning. The goals were reached quite successfully, as education was formed in a totalitarian fashion and the ideology conveyed by it was also totalitarian by nature, whereby the ideology had quite a comprehensive hold of the children"s and adolescents" thinking and life-world. In a system like this and in this kind of ideology human growth could not, however, be realised, if the criterion for it is the orientation toward universal morality and the learning of democratic ways to exercise power and of the competencies needed in them. Pedagogy and education are used to solve the conflicts in the learning processes that are present in each society. The dialectic critical concept of education can be defined as follows. Pedagogy (and education as one of its implementers) is an attempt to solve the unresolved conflicts in conflicting learning processes. Its success means human growth and realisation of learning processes that are in line with what was aimed at. The aspiration for and realisation of human growth is the most important criterion that distinguishes the concepts of pedagogy and manipulation. Pedagogy and education should thus be in the service of human growth and not of the exercise of power aiming at supremacy. The problem remains that education is always to a certain degree in the service of social power irrespective of the type of society.

A teaching of National Socialism to the posterity concerning power and morality is the fact that a democratic society, pluralism, multiculturality and increased appreciation between cultures emerge as the important goals. The construction of democratic social power presupposes the existence of an opposition, whereby power is determined both as the power of the ruling power elite and as a counterpower and whereby it is not autocracy by nature. The morality determining the National Socialist ideology also makes it known to the future generations that a morality that is restricted to a group and treads down other groups" rights cannot claim the position of universal morality, which is why the construction of a morality that is directed to universal rights emerges as the central goal, focusing on cultural pluralism, intercultural tolerance and respect for other cultures. A pluralistic idea of pedagogy and guarantees for democracy in the educational system and society are also worth pursuing. The realisation of democracy requires learning to be critical, as criticalness functions as the only precondition for a single right ideology not to be justified. Learning to exercise power democratically also requires participation in the discussion about joint affairs and learning to participate.

I will finally summarise what kind of learning opportunities these two politics of truth opened up, and in what form the learning processes that developed in their sphere manifested themselves (and in what form they did not). The democratising politics of truth opened up more learning opportunities that the National Socialist politics of truth did, with the latter being based on an ideology that was defined as the only right one. The learning processes complying with the National Socialist politics of truth were oriented above all militaristically and nationalistically, although they also promoted economic processes and employment. These politics of truth did not allow intellectual learning processes. The moral learning processes were determined according to the nationalistic moral code, which was a code that allowed "immorality" from the viewpoint of the universal human rights. It was a standstill of moral learning processes and a barbarous regression on the base of the criteria of the Habermasian discourse ethics and the discourse of morality of the critical theory. The politics of truth in question were lacking any democratic practices. The democratic learning processes were restricted to the equality of opportunities. An inconsistent idea of equality prevailed in National Socialism. Conservative educational equality was emphasised, among other things, although the system finally became elitist. This fact results in the conclusion that democratic political practises and egalitarian learning processes can proceed at a different pace. Little communicative rationality was to be found. Processes in its direction did materialise in interaction between people just like previously in socio-cultural evolution. The National Socialist politics of truth shut up the learning processes in the iron cage of instrumental rationality. The power system produced above all morally condemnable and condemned consequences — Auschwitz. The politics of truth and the pedagogical ideology as its part were promoting it. Power was, however, partly productive even in this system, but above all it was heavily destructive. Meanwhile the power materialised in the democratising politics of truth was above all productive by nature. Democratising politics of truth made it possible for the learning processes to be multilinear. The learning processes adhering to it were directed to democratisation, but there would have been room for improvement in terms of equality. The concept of educational equality acquired a more radical meaning, but its emphasis on the equality of opportunities remained without aiming at levelling down initial differences. The issue of equality between men and women, for instance, was something that was not mentioned at all in the materials concerning democratising re-education programmes. In the sphere of this politics of truth there were, however, intellectual learning processes that made criticism possible, and they are a prerequisite for democratic social practices. In addition to learning processes that aimed at democratisation, an important position in this period of transformation in society and world politics was had, however, by the economic processes whose promotion was associated with general human interests, world peace and human rights. The moral learning processes were directed to post-conventional goals which were not, however, realised even in this socio-historical situation. The practices of the new politics of truth also turned out to be manipulative and the aspect of power emerged as a struggle for supremacy. It is true, however, that goals targeted at communicative rationality were set officially in this politics of truth unlike in the National Socialist politics of truth. The possibilities for them to come true were watered down in practice by the struggles for supremacy and manipulation even in this politics of truth. However, the prerequisites for public discourses improved. The movement and direction were towards communicative rationality. Pedagogy and education promoted it.

When an answer is sought to the question in what form the learning processes developed in this era materialised and in what form they did not materialise, the attention is drawn to the moral learning processes in particular. The teachings concerning morality were above all learned from Auschwitz in the socio-historical sense. Other important questions also emerge. How could the influences of the previous power regime be seen, and how did the previous politics of truth determine the "emancipatory discourse" of democratising re-education? The problematic relationship between power and morality became the target of examination. The Foucauldian thesis about the use of an enormous amount of power by means of the moral code materialised historically at any given time was supported by an analysis of the politics of truth of the National Socialists. This was seen in this politics of truth in such a way that the National Socialist moral code confirmed the prevailing ideological influences that were conveyed through education. The result was that a set of values that made Auschwitz possible was adopted. The Habermasian argument that the principles of discourse ethics and the argumentation concerning norms emerged as important factors determining the moral code after the development of the modern world view was to be questioned in the light of the analysis of National Socialist politics of truth. This argumentation never happened, although it must be admit that different moral codes, ones that resisted National Socialism, existed even in this society. The prevailing code was, however, the "traditionalistic" moral code determined by the National Socialist supremacy that was characterised by mysticism. It was the internal moral code of the community of National Socialists that did not meet the criteria of "universal", post-conventional morality. The scientific knowledge used to support this politics of truth was not tested in critical argumentation, either.

Power was also used through the moral code of the democratising politics of truth. Power was used especially clearly through pedagogy, as even the new politics of truth was conveyed essentially by education. The function of pedagogy was to secure the main ideological influences even in this case. The adoption of a set of values that enabled democracy took place at least partly, which was also the purpose. In addition to the moral code of the Allied and those who were involved in the emancipatory-democratic discourse, there still was the conservative (National Socialist) moral code that shaped for its own part the contents of the emancipatory-democratic discourse and the politics of truth. The principle of discourse ethics materialised in the contents and goals of emancipatory pedagogy. It is true that the processes or the realisation of argumentation still left room for improvement, as the manipulative nature of the politics of truth remained. Even this discourse can also be defined as the politics of truth. The moral code of the democratising politics of truth was characterised by a universalist orientation. It is not grounded, however, maintain unambiguously that the moral code in question developed post-conventional subjectivity or socialness, but it is grounded to maintain that it at least made possible the development of such a subjective and collective identity unlike the National Socialist moral code did.

The progress of learning processes in the direction of communicative rationality leaves, however, a lot to be desired. But if the new politics of truth are compared to the earlier totalitarian politics of truth and its moral code, it is grounded to argue that it was a great advance into this direction. The pedagogical processes also had an influence on the progress of social learning processes into this direction, as it is especially the pedagogical processes between subjects that provide the situations in which new kinds of moral consciousness emerge. The post-conventional "moral code" based on universal human worth became the officially accepted moral code in this social and international situation. Beneath the surface the conservative-nationalistic moral code also survived, which has manifested itself culturally and also in scientific discourses in racism, neoconservative groupings, and revisionist approaches. The ethics of science and moral issues were in a highly precarious state even in the new situation, which is proved for instance by the struggles in the connection of the dismissals of university and teaching staff. The most important thing is, however, that moral questions were given attention in the discourses of critical theory. Yet it is necessary to ask the rhetorical question if the fact that a discourse emphasises democracy secures it a cognitively privileged position that makes it possible to maintain that the discourse is more truthful than another one. It is at least possible to maintain that it is morally more justifiable.

So far as the connections between scientific knowledge and power are concerned, it can be argued that there were major differences in the degree of hierarchy in the organisation of knowledge between the two politics of truth. Meanwhile hierarchy determined to what extent it was possible to produce knowledge and discourse that was capable of resistance. The final conclusion is, however, that the change in the politics of truth did not take place through discursive resistance, but it was realised due to the military change in the power regime that was "external" to the scientific community. This produced a discourse and a politics of truth that enabled critical argumentation and the discursive power struggles that are typical of democratic scientific communities. Both types of rationality, the communicative and instrumental-strategic ones, the former of which materialised in discursive morality and the latter as dominating power, moved the historical learning processes but produced different results. The most important problem is what kind of rationality starts in each case to direct the mainstream of history and what can be learned from the pathologies of historical learning processes. It can be maintained on the basis of historical evidence that traces of a different rationality, the communicative one, can even be found in pathologies such as Auschwitz. The zones of communicative rationality did not, however, have a chance to direct history under a totalitarian power regime, because it would have required that people who created such a marginal phenomenon should have had the power to direct the course of history. This requirement is contrafactual in relation to the principles of discourse ethics and communicatively formed morality. As a critical comment a further question much be asked: to what extent is it realistic to assume that the disputable requirements for validity are acknowledged or that the communication takes place in a symmetric way?

It is justifiable to criticise Habermas" idea of the ideal speech situation for the fact that it presupposes omniscience or someone knowing the final truth, as truthfulness can ultimately only be evaluated if it is known. This possibility is questioned and proved to be an ill-founded ideal by the historical analysis of the National Socialist politics of truth. The National Socialist politics of truth broke consciously the requirement for the validity of truth, justice and honesty through its manipulative ideology, as its goal was to construct a great "collective lie". Meanwhile the declarations of democratising discourses attempted to realise these requirements for validity, even though the manipulative aspect was still realised in the practices of the politics of truth. In both of the politics of truth the central elements were power relations in which the conditions of symmetrical communication were not materialised, although they had been expressed as goals for the discourse aiming at democratisation. Although it is not grounded to argue in conclusion that learning processes directed by instrumental rationality were replaced by ones directed by communicative rationality, it is grounded to maintain that the learning processes directed by communicative rationality now became worthy of pursuit.

So what was learned from Auschwitz, and what was not learned? On the superficial level of official politics, more democratic and moral social practices were learned, which has not, however, been able to make sure that the pathologies of the historical processes that led to Auschwitz do not still live on the deep level that can be excavated from the depths of history — on both the individual, collective and social levels.