9.1. Conflicts of modernity, education and social learning

One of the goals of the study was to examine the dialectics of power and morality in socio-historical learning processes. As a conclusion it is grounded to argue that these learning processes were moved and they were directed by a social power system. The results of the learning processes were, however, generated by the dialectics of power and counterpower in both cases. The possibilities for counterpower to emerge in particular explains to what extent intended and unintended results arose. The National Socialist politics of truth and the pedagogy that was to convey it realised the requirements of such politics of truth, producing the results meant by it or the National Socialist subjects in quite the optimum way. For instance the protests by students in the academic world of the 1960s evidence, however, that even education in accordance with the democratic-emancipatory politics of truth succeeded in producing the intended results by educating critical subjects. The effects of this politics of truth were not, however, as total by nature as those of the National Socialist politics of truth, as it was possible for many different and pluralistic kinds of subjects to emerge under a democratic ideology. The most significant difference in the formation of the subjects who grew in the sphere of these politics of truth was in the amount of power that people had to themselves. The degree of autonomy among the subjects or "social maturity" varied in the sphere of influence of these politics of truth in such a way that the democratising politics of truth allowed greater autonomy than the National Socialist politics of truth that was strongly based also on personal submission to discipline. The degree of autonomy also varied depending on the positions. The positions of people changed essentially as the politics of truth changed. Autonomy increased in the case of some people, and decreased in the case of others.

Both of the politics of truth were thoroughly permeated by power. Meanwhile there were significant differences in the degree of suppression and the negative effects of power. The most important difference was seen in how freely it was possible to think and act under these two politics of truth. Differences could be noticed in the possibilities to express criticism and in the emergence of communication. The basic nature of the National Socialist politics of truth was suppressive, and it repressed dissident opinion and action. It was not admissible to criticise the system. There were no possibilities for free critical communication. Meanwhile the democratising politics of truth opened up these possibilities, on the basis of which its power influences can be defined as emancipatory and productive. Thereby the way in which power and power relations were structured also changed from authoritarian and hierarchical relations of authority to a networked power system in which the emergence of international communication relations had an important role.

The power analysis that was carried out made visible not only these power influences on the general social level but also the micromechanisms of power, or local technologies, techniques and tactics of power. These disciplinarian microforms of power were seen especially well in the analysis of the practices in Auschwitz, and also in the examination of the education given by the National Socialist youth organisations. The Auschwitz analysis proves that the power influences of the National Socialist system were most questionable from the moral point of view. It is true that restricted communicative rationality could actually be discerned in the descriptions of the concentration camps, but it still had no chance to direct socio-historical learning processes in this power system. It is grounded to maintain contrafactually that Auschwitz would not have been possible if social power had emerged as communicative power, as it would have required the acknowledgement of the human worth of Jews and other persecuted groups.

The most important distinguishing factor between the two politics of truth can be found in the justifiability of the power realised by them and in the interests of the each power system. There is a good reason to maintain that learning in the direction of communicative rationality had taken place when the shift was made from the National Socialist to the democratising politics of truth, and that the new politics of truth was more rational by nature. The influences of power that materialised in the democratising re-education programmes were more diversified and scattered, which is why the realisation of this process can also be called "the dispersion of power" and at the same time democratisation which resulted in numerous points of power replacing the autocratic domination by the centrally leading dictator. It is not, however, grounded to argue that the new system had "a higher morality", as no large-scale realisation of post-conventional morality or social learning processes directing influences could be unambiguously observed.

Although the socio-historical learning processes advancing from the National Socialist politics of truth to the democratising re-education programmes were indisputably democratising and egalitarian, the realisation of moral learning processes in particular left a lot to be desired, as post-conventional morality was not achieved on any large scale and the nature of the learning processes was not determined according to the principles of discourse ethics. It is true, however, that it proceeded in that direction at least officially. Moral learning remained, however, for the most part an unrealised learning potential, as both of the politics of truth were based on egoistic interests according to which they realised the conventional moral principles. Democratic re-education politics declared an emphasis on the universal human rights. The goals of this politics and the education that was planned for its direction contained the idea of collective learning and communicative rationality, but they could not realise such learning processes in practice. The problem was above all the moral learning processes, although some progress was indeed made in the realisation of democratic learning processes.

The pedagogical practices of the democratising re-education programmes aimed at learning processes that can realise communicative rationality, as the goal was also to influence the dissolution of the positions of dominance in the German society. The basic conflict between pedagogy and social learning was seen in these attempts as well. Even though it would have been possible for rational communication to exist in pedagogical interaction, it was not necessarily possible for it to exist as political communication in these extremely conflicting circumstances. And the realisation of rational political communication is the prerequisite for the social learning processes to evolve in the direction of communicative rationality.

In this study the most important problem was the question of what kind of social learning processes emerged as the dominant ones from among the ambivalent tendencies and possibilities in the German society in the researched era, ranging from the 1930"s to the 1960"s. A second problem was how the relations between pedagogy and social learning processes were constructed. The relation between the pedagogical and socio-political became dialectical in such a way that an aspect of domination manifested itself even in the democratic re-education programmes, assuming a conflicting relation to communicative rationality that pedagogical activity strives for. This conflict had an influence on the main direction of socio-historical learning. The situation was defined in this age of social transformation as a field of counterforces. On the basis of the historical analysis it is necessary to observe that the effects of the manifestations (including education) of communicative rationality were smaller than those of general politics, the practices of which were still strongly characterised by instrumental rationality.

No unambiguous answer can be given to the question what the influence of pedagogy and education was on the realisation of these democratic social learning processes, as it is not possible on the basis of the analysis carried out to distinguish the effects of pedagogy and education from the effects of other cultural processes. It can be said, however, that the influences of the re-education programmes and of the humanitarian democratic mentality that emerged in the sphere of their influence have not been minor in the German society. Communicative rationality did not, however, assume a central role even in these processes, although the moral issues did receive more emphasis in discussions. Power was still based strongly on positions of domination and power struggles. The politics of the re-education programmes was also characterised by the manipulative aspect that is typical of communication directed by strategic-instrumental rationality. Educational and pedagogical activities and the scientific discourse on which these activities were based were, however, paving the way for learning processes into the direction of communicative rationality. The mainstream of social learning processes proceeded, however, above all in economic technological learning processes just like it had done before. Serious attention was given, however, to the importance of politico-moral learning processes in this critical situation, which also raised these processes to a position in which they could direct social development.

The theory of communicative action introduced by Jürgen Habermas is supported by the historical analysis carried out. Discourse without domination remained, however, a utopia for whose realisation it is not realistic or not necessarily even reasonable to wait, because its realisation would be likely to mean the end of communication. So on what basis can we maintain that communicative rationality is reasonable, if its ideal form, the ideal speech situation, is not?